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Abstract: This research investigates the relationship between under-expenditure of the social welfare 
budget within a limited budget and the determinants that have an effect on them. Relationships and de­
terminants between under-expenditure of the social welfare budget have generally received relatively 
little attention from academics. The aim of this article is to examine the differences in the un­
der-expenditures of the social welfare budget in the Korea between 1965 and 2008. It is shown that pub­
lic assistance and social service expenditures are not comparable with national insurance expenditure 
according to the Box-Jenkins’ multi-variant ARIMA models. The appearance of them being commensu­
rate is spurious because it is affected by political economic factors.
The research findings in this paper can contribute to the development of budgetary theory and budget­
ary politics. However some findings within in the ARIMA models were incapable of being interpreted 
within existing theories and conjecture such as those with a 9 year time lag, etc. Further studies are there­
fore required.
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Political and economic factors and the social welfare budget
Many political factors can be considered to affect the growth in government ex­penditure: leader’s influence, legislators’ activities, bureaucrats’ behaviour (in­
cluding not only budgetary officials’ but also street level bureaucrats’ perceptions and 
attitudes), interest groups’ pressure or clients’ influence as well as public opinion.
Their effects are diverse: Some are negative, while others are positive; sometimes 
they offset each other, and sometimes they reinforce each other. Though it is difficult to 
define their impacts in a word, it is generally assumed that an increase in social pol­
icy-related political activities will lead to an increase in the social welfare budget. Eco­
nomic factors also affect social welfare budget decision making. For example, Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), the Consumer Price Index (ygdp) and the unemployment rate 
may all affect budget growth.
However quantitative research on the causal relationship between political economic 
factors and the social welfare budget is rare. Moreover, no attempt has been made to con­
nect normative theories developed in the discipline o f social work with empirical evi­
dence. Topics such as the nature o f need, the characteristics o f clients, fundraising 
methods, eligibility criteria for social service, methods o f service distribution, and the 
level o f social service offered by government in the range o f various social welfare initia­
tives have been lectured and discussed in the classroom, but have rarely been used to ex­
plain empirical research findings.
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Factors that determine government expenditure can be explained through the theory 
of determinants and incrementalism (Nordhaus, 1975; Tufte, 1978; Monroe, 1983; 
Downs, 1960; Hibbs, 1978; Russett, 1982; Kingdon, 1984; Wildavsky & Davis, 1974). 
Nevertheless there remains an unexplained aspect. In particular, time lag and leverage of 
degree o f factors have not been examined to date.
We can presume two contradictory assumptions about the impact of the economic fac­
tors on budget growth. One is that the increase in social expenditure is expected due to the 
improvement in the economic situation: Better economic conditions may bring about an 
increase in the amount o f resources (e.g. budget growth due to the increase in general tax 
revenue) which can be used for more social services. Another is that the increase in social 
program expenditure is expected when the economic situation becomes worse: A worsen­
ing economic situation creates a greater need for government services, and this greater 
need may force the government to increase in social expenditure.
However does an improvement in economic conditions really bring about an increase 
in social expenditure due to the increase in the government’s resource capacity? Or does 
the economic recession create a demand for services and do these increasing demands 
yield more social expenditures? Which opinion is right, and which is incorrect?
The answers to these questions are not simple because the impact o f political and eco­
nomic factors on social expenditure growth may vary according to the type o f social wel­
fare. Different degrees, directions and time-lags in those impacts can be explained in 
terms o f the nature o f each program.
In Korea social welfare can be broadly divided into three categories: public assistance, 
social insurance and social service programs. Their characteristics are quite different in 
terms of the nature o f need, political sensitivity, funding methods, eligibility criteria, 
methods o f service distribution, and the level o f benefits provided.
Generally speaking the needs assumed in public assistance and social service pro­
grams are more variable than those in social insurance programs, because the former de­
pends on variable economic situations while the latter depends mainly on non-economic 
situations which may be easily anticipated in advance: For example public assistance and 
social service needs occur when one’s income decreases, while most o f the social insur­
ance needs appear when one becomes old enough to retire.
Public assistance and social service expenditure are less political than social insurance 
expenditure because welfare programs have fewer organised pressure groups than social 
insurance programs. The elderly are known to be one of the most powerful constituents, 
while the poor are the least powerful. Therefore electoral officials may have a tendency to 
consider the former more important than the latter in terms o f their re-election, while the 
professionals including both government bureaucrats and street level workers think the 
latter is as important as the former, not only because public assistance and social service 
programs are as essential for their agency’s survival as the social insurance programs, but 
also because they are normatively involved in both programs with a professional con­
sciousness.
Public assistance and social service expenditure is normally funded by general tax 
revenue, while social insurance expenditure is funded by contributions (ear-marked 
taxes). The public assistance and social service fund might be directly affected by eco­
nomic conditions. The economic situation leads to the increase or decrease in tax revenue
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which is reflected in public assistance and social service expenditure. However, social in­
surance expenditure is based on “the self-supporting financing principle” (Myers, 1983, 
p. 4; O ’Neill, 1979, p. 173). The social insurance fund is also affected by economic condi­
tions such as income changes, but the economic impact on social insurance expenditure 
might be less than that on public assistance and social service expenditure.
The benefits o f public assistance and social service funds are enjoyed by those who 
suffer from insufficient income, while the benefits o f social insurance programs are en­
joyed by all those who are eligible regardless o f their income level.
Public assistance and social service benefits are distributed through means testing, 
while social insurance benefits are provided to those who are eligible without a means 
test. The level o f social insurance payments are more easily predicted than those o f wel­
fare needs. Therefore public assistance and social service expenditures can be executed 
more flexibly than social insurance expenditure because the public assistance and social 
service payments can be controlled by a means test.
In general terms, the national minimum principle is applied to those who live on pub­
lic assistance and social service benefits. This principle means that public assistance and 
social service benefits paid cannot be higher than the income o f minimum wage earners. 
However this principle is not applied to social insurance beneficiaries. The level o f social 
insurance payment is, for the most part, determined by one’s contributions and current 
standard o f living.
Theoretical Debate and Hypothesis
The factors that determine government expenditure can be explained by way o f the 
theory of determinants and incrementalism.
The theory o f determinants can be classified into studies conducted by economists and 
political scientists. While economists develop theories based on verifications after pre­
senting hypothesis that government expenditure is determined by external factors such as 
social economic phenomenon, political scientists would argue that political variables 
play an important or even more important role than social economic factors in determin­
ing government expenditure. Political scientists highlight the influence that political fac­
tors have on government expenditure such as the characteristics o f parties, the election 
turnout and electoral competition, and they attempt to prove the hypothesis that “Political 
phenomenon is more important that economic phenomenon”1 or that “Political phe­
nomenon may not be more important than economic phenomenon, but it is still just as 
important.” Scholars that assert the political business cycle theory believe that the imple­
mentation o f presidential or parliamentary elections greatly influences government ex­
penditure in the previous or same year o f the elections (Nordhaus, 1975; Tufte, 1978; 
Monroe, 1983). Downs (1960) also argued that politicians use public expenditure to max­
imize their votes, while others even claimed that the ruling ideology o f the President, as
1 Representative studies are Wagner’s Law. Wagner’s Law, I.e., The proposition that government 
spending as a share o f  national income tends to grow in the course o f  economic development has become 
more or less a stylized fact in public finance (Henrekson, M. 1993, p. 412).
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the head of the administration, also greatly influences the government expenditure 
(Hibbs, 1978; Russett, 1982; Kingdon, 1984). Such theories o f determinants help to 
explain the environmental variables that influence decisions surrounding government 
expenditure.
Incrementalism theory, namely that the most important factor in determining this 
year’s government expenditure is the previous year’s (t minus 1) government expendi­
ture, applies the incrementalism presented by Wildavsky as a complementary or alterna­
tive decision-making measure on the budget. In contrast to the theory o f determinants 
which focuses on environments outside the government, Wildavsky focused on proce­
dural aspects within the government. Yet this theory was criticized as it did not consider 
this very environment, and Wildavsky and Davis, who modelled incrementalism for the 
first time, also acknowledged economic and political influence by saying that “The bud­
get process is fundamentally incrementalistic, and it requires pressure o f sudden change 
caused by extreme incidents to respond to the needs of the economy and society” (1974, 
p. 421).
Therefore, consideration o f the theory o f determinants (which cannot explain changes 
or trends) along with the incrementalism theory (which cannot explain environmental 
variables) may better explain the determining factors o f government expenditures.
Song (1989a, 1989b & 1990) stated through his research that the United States’ public 
assistance and social insurance expenditures are closely related to the economic situation, 
but are different from the direction o f applicable variables. Therefore when GDP impacts 
upon budget execution, public assistance expenditure decreases while social insurance 
expenditure increases; and when the unemployment rate rises, public assistance expendi­
ture increases while social insurance expenditure remains unchanged. This result identi­
fies the reason to be the difference in the originating factor that requires the two 
expenditures. Public assistance expenditure is supplied through the general tax revenue, 
and it therefore increases in line with economic recession and when the number o f people 
below the poverty line increases. On the other hand, social insurance expenditure applies 
the self-supporting financing principle and is rarely influenced by the economic situa­
tions as it is connected with clients above the age o f 65. Yet as social insurance expendi­
ture may slightly vary on the premise o f life insurance, it may show an increasing trend 
during times o f economic prosperity (Song G. W., 1990, pp. 439-453).
Song’s studies (1989a, 1989b & 1990) analyse the factors that influence the United 
States federal budget, and it requires analysis on whether it is applicable for the Republic 
of Korea as well.
This study will analyze primarily on the aforementioned economic, political and ad­
ministrative factors to identify their influences on under-expenditures o f the social wel­
fare budget.
Therefore, the hypothesis for this study analyses Song’s research (1989a, 1989b 
& 1990) hypothesis that “Public assistance expenditure increases at a time o f economic 
recession,” “Social insurance expenditure increases at a time o f economic prosperity” 
and “Political factors are more influential on social insurance expenditure than on public 
assistance expenditure.” This study also plans to confirm through the aforementioned hy­
pothesis verification whether the result displayed in the United States federal budget can 
be applied to the causes o f social welfare expenditure in the Republic o f Korea.
PP 3 ’15 The difference in under-expenditure of the social welfare budget in Korea 25
Furthermore, this study sets a hypothesis that “Public assistance expenditure has 
a ‘go-with relationship’ with social service expenditure” and validates it on whether so­
cial service expenditure, operated through resources identical to that of public assistance 
expenditure, shares the same characteristics with public assistance expenditure.
Hypotheses
1. Public assistance expenditure increases during economic recession.
2. Social insurance expenditure increases during economic prosperity.
3. Political factors have more influence on social insurance expenditure than on pu­
blic assistance expenditure.
4. Public assistance expenditure has a ‘go-with relationship’ with social service 
expenditure.
Variables, Data Collection and Measurement
In order to examine the differences in the impacts o f political and economic variables on 
expenditure growth between public assistance, social service and social insurance, three de­
pendent variables were used namely expenditure for public assistance (ypaex), expenditure 
for social service (ysiex) and expenditure for social insurance programs (ysiex).
The budget outlay o f “the public assistance programmes” for ypaex, “the social ser­
vice programmes” for yswsex  and that o f “social insurance programmes” for ysiex  were 
used and were collected from the Fiscal Yearbook during the period 1965 to 2008.
As a political variable the percentage of conservative lawmakers (congr) -  which is 
measured by dividing the number o f conservative party members in the National Assem­
bly legislature into the total rate in The annals o f  the Republic ofKorea National Assem­
bly from  1948 to 2008 -  was used, and all elections (ele) whether they were presidential 
elections or parliamentary elections were included. Government reorganisation (reorg), 
which is measured by calculating the number o f reorganisations within The Ministry o f  
Health and Welfare was also used.
Economic situations can be indicated by GDP figures (ygdp), ygdp  figures (ygdp), 
the economic growth rate (erg), the unemployment rate (une) and the IM F  economic 
crisis (IMF). These indicators were originally considered in this paper as economic 
variables. However ygdp  was eliminated because the bivariate correlations between 
them are so high that a multi-collinearity problem might occur. Instead, in order to re­
move the inflationary effect on budget expenditures (ypaex, yswsex and ysiex) and GDP 
(ygdp), they were manipulated in terms o f the constant figure o f 2005 by dividing them 
by ygdp.
All o f the data already adjusted to the fiscal year were collected from The Korean Sta­
tistical Information Service (http://kosis.kr) and The Bank ofK orea Economic Statistics 
System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). The monthly data o f one were transformed into yearly data 
adjusted to the fiscal year.
As a demographic factor, the population size (pop) collected from The Korean Statis­
tical Information Service was also originally considered, but later eliminated because of
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the same problem. Instead, GDP (ygdp) and the expenditure amounts are divided by pop­
ulation, and are represented in terms o f p er capita.
Statistical Methods
The Box-Jenkins multivariate ARIMA modelling technique is used to examine the 
causal relationship between the three social expenditures and political economic vari­
ables. The reasons why the multi-variate ARIMA technique was chosen was: Firstly, dy­
namic models can be developed in an empirical way based on actual data to explain 
public assistance and social service expenditure growth because the ARIMA procedure 
can capture the impact o f the lag structures o f the variables. Secondly, by using the 
ARIMA approach we can get a more precise model without an auto-correlation problem, 
which is ordinarily assumed in the time series data, and which often becomes problematic 
when using the ordinary least square (OLS) regression method or other econometric 
methods. Thirdly, as a consequence, the model parameters are estimated with a high de­
gree o f reliability (See, McLeay, Hay, 1980, p. 271).
The procedures for building a multivariate ARIMA model are briefly summarized as 
follows: Firstly, univariate models are built for both dependent variable time series and 
independent variable time series.
Secondly, the cross-correlation functions (CCF) between the pre-whitened independ­
ent variable time series and the pre-whitened dependent variable time series are examined 
in order to find a transfer function component for the model.
Thirdly, based on the CCF information, a multivariate model is developed and ana­
lysed as follows: The parameter estimates for the transfer function components and noise 
components are examined in terms o f their statistical adequacy. I f  some parameter esti­
mates are clearly not statistically significant, the model parameters must be re-estimated, 
omitting the insignificant parameter estimates.
The residuals o f the model are analyzed to find out whether (or not) they are 
auto-correlated, whether they are different than white noise, and whether they are inde­
pendent o f each input time series. I f  the residuals o f the tentative model are not 
auto-correlated, not different than white noise, and independent o f each input time series, 
then the model can be accepted. However, if  one o f these conditions is not met, other 
noise components or new transfer function components must be re-identified by review­
ing the univariate models and CCF functions.
If  the multivariate model is statistically significant and adequate, then we interpret the 
time lag structure in the model.
The basic form o f multivariate model is as follows:
Y  = 9 + y  , 1 - 9 !B - 9 2B 2 ■■■ + a
1 0 - 8 1 (B ) § 2(B2) ■ ■ " 1 - ^  1 (B) ^ 2 (B2) ■ ■
where Yt is an output time series, X it is an input time series, 0 o is a constant term, ffii is 
a numerator, 8i is denominator, 0 i is am oving average factor, ^  is an autoregressive fac­
tor, B  is a backward shift operator and at is a white noise term.
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Findings and Discussions 
1) Relationships between social welfare expenditures
After the complicated procedures o f the multivariate ARIMA modelling, multivariate 
regression equations are acquired as follows.
Table 1 indicates that public assistance expenditure (ypaex) was affected by social in­
surance expenditure (ysiex). Table 2 is suggests that social insurance expenditure was af­
fected by public assistance expenditure.
Table 1
Correlation of ypaex  and ysiex
Laa Covariance Correlation - 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 29.943872 0 49761 |**********
1 5.278117 0 08771 . 1** .
2 1.901455 0 03160 1 , 1* . I
3 -7.167715 - 11911 1 . **| . 1
4 -10,747463 - 17860 p ****
5 -14.790169 - 24578 *****|
6 14.621745 0 24298 , 1*****,
7 5.532110 0 09193 . 1** .
8 12.023701 0 19981 , 1**** ,
9 6.402280 0 10639 1 . 1** . 1
10 -0.586623 - 00975
“.” marks two standard error, period(s) of differencing 1.
Conditional Least Squares Estimation
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Lag Variable Shift
ARi,i -0.48103 0.14696 3.27 0.0022 1 ypaex 0
NUM1 0.40111 0.12798 3.13 0.0032 0 ysiex 0
Table 2
Correlation of ysiex  and ypaex
Lag Cova i ance C orre la tion -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 10.774880 0.17509 * * * *  ,
1 21.452890 0,34861 * * * * * * *
2 9.420118 0,15308 * * *
3 10,554224 0.17150 * * *  t
4 -1 ,322635 -.0 214 3 ' I
5 -0 ,476416 -.0 0 7 7 4 . I
6 -9 .285217 -.1 5 0 8 8 * * * I
7 -5 ,738560 -.0 9 3 2 5 * * I
8 -7 ,236606 -,1 175 9 * * I
9 -6 ,877037 -.1 117 5 * * I
10 6,234396 0,10131 * *
”.” marks two standard errors, period(s) of differencing 1
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Conditional Least Squares Estimation
Parameter Estimate StandardError t Value Pr > |t| Lag Variable Shift
MA1,1 -0.54893 0.17947 -3.06 0.0043 2 ysiex 0
NUM! 0.39676 0.12814 3.10 0.0039 0 ypaex 1
ypaext(1 -  B) = 0.48ypaext-1(1 -  B) + 0.40ysiext(1 -  B) + at (1)
ysiext(1 -  B) = -0.10ypaext-1(1 -  B) + 0.19ypaext-2(1 -  B) + at (2)
Equations (1) and (2) indicate that public assistance expenditure (ypaex) and so­
cial insurance expenditure (ysiex) were affected by one another. This equation can be 
interpreted as follows: this mathematical model shows that the yearly public assis­
tance p er  capita is affected by last year’s increment o f 40% in the social insurance ex­
penditure p er  capita. And the increment o f this year’s social insurance expenditure 
p er  capita can be explained in last year’s decrement o f public assistance p er  capita. 
From this it might be deduced that the two expenditures have a positive effect on each 
other.
Tables 3 and 4 indicate that social service expenditure (yswsex) and social insurance 
expenditure (ysiex) were affected by one another.
Table 3
Correlation of ysw sex  and ysiex
Lag Covariance Corre I at ion -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 -9.196783 -.17226 . ***1 .
1 -10.408135 -.19495 _ **** _
2 3.993212 0.07480 . 1 * .
3 12.596551 0.23594 , 1 ***** ,
4 -6.435792 -.12055 . **
5 -4.469971 -.08373 . ** 1 .
6 -12.034622 -.22542 _ *****
7 12.702420 0,23793 ***** _
8 6.874996 0.12877 ***
9 18.125850 0.33951 *******
10 9.446345 0.17694 , 1**** ,
marks two standard errors, period(s) of differencing 1
Conditional Least Squares Estimation
Parameter Estimate StandardError t Value Pr > |t| Lag Variable Shift
NUM, 0.47785 0.15488 3.09 0.0041 0 ysiex 9
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Table 4
Correlation of ysiex  and yswsex
Lag C ovar iance  C o r r e l a t i o n  -1 9 8 7 8 5 4 3 2 1  0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 -8 .384 559 - .1 6 0 8 6  | . * * * | .
1 16.047038 0 .30786 I * * * * * *
2 6.759465 0 .12988 | . I * * *  .
3 5.572953 0 .10692 I . * *  .
4 15.577797 0 .29886 I * * * * * *
5 10.642271 0 .20417 | , * * * *  t
6 -0 .970 562 - .0 1 8 6 2  |
7 -21 .648907 - .4 1 5 3 3  | * * * * * * * *
8 0.275119 0 .00528 |
9 -3 .065 028 - .0 5 8 8 0  | ■ * l  ■ I
10 -4 .941 684 -.09481  | . * *  | .
11 -1 .865691 - .0 3 5 7 9  I . * l  .
”.” marks two standard errors, period(s) of differencing 1
Conditional Least Squares Estimation
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Lag Variable Shift
MA1,1 -0.62776 0.14029 -4.47 <0001 2 ysiex 0
NUM1 0.41241 0.18276 2.26 0.0310 0 yswsex 1
NUM1,1 -0.50328 0.21174 -2.38 0.0236 3 yswsex 1
n u m 1>2 1.57884 0.26089 6.05 <0001 6 yswsex 1
DEN1,1 -0.93329 0.14466 -6.45 <0001 1 yswsex 1
yswsext(1 -  B) = 0.48ysiext-9(1 -  B) + at (3)
. „ (0.41 + 0.50B3 -  1.58B6) „ . . , „ 2 .
ysiext (1 -  B ) = ------------------------------- yswsext , + (1 + 063B )a t (4)
1 + 0.93B
Equation (3) and (4) indicate that social insurance expenditure (ysiex) and social ser­
vice expenditure (yswsex) were affected by one another. According to the empirical data, 
social insurance expenditure p er capita o f 9 years ago led to an increase in 48% of social 
service per capita. However, it is not known exactly why the increment o f 9 years ago 
affects the figures in this year’s in budget. Furthermore social insurance expenditure 
per capita is affected by social service p er capita. For example if  last year’s yswsex in­
creased by 1,000 won (unit o f Korean currency), this year’s siex increment is 210 won 
(0.41/(1+0.93)). And fouryears ago if  swsex increased by 1,000 won, this siex increment 
is 260 won (0.50/(1+0.93)). Seven years ago if  swsex increased by 1,000, this year’s siex 
decrease was 819 (-1.58/(1+0.93)). In addition, the net impact that social service expen­
diture has affected social insurance expenditure is -0.34. In other words if  social service 
expenditure increased by 1,000 won, social insurance expenditure decreased by 340 won.
Table 5 and equation (5) show that social service expenditure (yswsex) was affected 
by public assistance expenditure (ypaex).
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Table 5
Correlation of ypaex  and yswsex
Lag Covar i ance C orre  1 at ion - 1 9  8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 7.610050 0 19574 * * * *  _
1 0.093543 0 00241
2 -2 .136 894 - 05496 . *
3 3.885150 0 09993 * *  ,
4 -0 .585028 - 01505
5 13.064535 0 33604 * * * * * * *
6 7.451340 0 19166 * * * *  t
7 7 .985364 0 20540 * * * *  .
8 -1 6 ,37 510 4 - 42120 * * * * * * * *
9 -1 .192596 - 03068 . *
10 4,430718 0 11397 * *  _
11 1,248205 0 03211 *  .
marks two standard errors, period(s) of differencing 1
Conditional Least Squares Estimation
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Lag Variable Shift
MA1,1 -0.63722 0.14987 -4.25 0.0002 1 ypaex 0
NUM1 0.96984 0.15329 6.33 <0001 0 yswsex 5
NUMU 1.05957 0.22829 4.64 <0001 3 yswsex 5
Table 6
Correlation of yswsex  and ypaex
Lag C ovar iance C orre  I a t  ion -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 8.014228 0.16789 * * *
1 £1.699813 0.45460 * * * * * * * * *
2 -4 .277799 - .0 8 9 6 2 * *  ■
3 -1 .973188 - .0 4 1 3 4 *  1 ■
4 2.883179 0.06040 1 *  .
5 - 1 .726857 - .0 3 6 1 8 *  1 ■
6 -12.858826 - .2 6 9 3 8 * * * * *  1 ,
7 -6 .088855 - .1 2 7 5 6 * * *
8 15.210673 0.31865 1 * * * * * *
9 16.259840 0.34063 1 * * * * * * *
10 0.694810 0.01456
”.” marks two standard errors, period(s) of differencing 1
Conditional Least Squares Estimation
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Lag Variable Shift
MAi,i -0.55269 0.15394 -3.59 0.0009 1 yswsex 0
NUM1 0.39399 0.01572 25.07 <.0001 0 ypaex 1
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ypaex(1  -  B) = 0.91yswsext-5 -  1.06yswsext-8 + (1 + 0.64B)at (5)
yswsext = 0.39ypaext-1 + (1 + 0.55B)at (6)
According to equation (5), social service per capita has influenced on public assis­
tance expenditure growth negatively. That is to say, this model shows that a 1,000 won in­
crease in public assistance expenditure per capita led to a decrease o f 9% (-0.08913) in 
social service per capita.
Table 6 and equation (6) show that public assistance expenditure (ypaex) was affected 
by social service expenditure (yswsex). According to this, public assistance expenditure 
was influenced in a positive way by the growth in social service per capita.
2) Determinants of the social welfare budget
What are the factors which determine the social welfare budget? After the compli­
cated procedures o f multivariate ARIMA modelling, multivariate regression equations 
are acquired as follows. Table 1 shows that social economic determinants impacted on 
public assistance expenditure (ypaex).
Table 1
The multivariate ARIMA modelling of public assistance expenditure
and determinants
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t value Pr > |t| Lag Variable Shift
ypaex
-ygdp
AR1,1 0.51983 0.18285 3.11 0.0038 1 ypaex 0
AR2,1 0.16419 0.16842 4.54 0.0001 3 ypaex 0
NUM1 -0.000602 0.0001361 -4.41 0.0001 0 yygdp 2
NUM1,1 -0.000439 0.0001429 -3.08 0.0048 2 ygdp 2
NUM1,2 0.0009951 0.0001139 5.12 <.0001 1 ygdp 2
n u m 1,3 -0.000554 0.0002091 -2.65 0.0132 8 ygdp 2
ypaex
-egr
AR1,1 0.90189 0.08131 11.08 <.0001 1 paex 0
NUM1 0.62605 0.24011 2.60 0.0141 0 egr 0
NUM1,1 0.11486 0.23534 3.04 0.0048 2 egr 0
n u m 1,2 0.13259 0.21665 3.38 0.0020 9 egr 0
ypaex
-une
AR1,1 0.80289 0.11131 1.21 <.0001 1 paex 0
NUM1 4.26005 0.81561 5.22 <.0001 0 une 2
DENU 0.68130 0.18313 3.15 0.0001 1 une 2
ypaex
-IMF
AR1,1 0.15950 0.11921 4.24 0.0002 2 paex 0
NUM1 9.15321 3.34555 2.14 0.0105 0 IMF 2
NUM1,1 -26.11533 3.34415 -1.83 <.0001 1 IMF 2
NUM1,2 -18.62811 3.34491 -5.51 <.0001 1 IMF 2
NUM1,3 -19.11610 5.15504 -3.11 0.0009 8 IMF 2
ypaex
-reorg
NUM1 6.69189 2.19112 3.05 0.0041 0 reorg 1
NUM1,1 -9.00010 2.31660 -3.89 0.0004 1 reorg 1
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ypaext(1 -  B) = (-0.0006ygdpt-2 + 0.00044ygdpt_4 -  0.001ygdpt-9 +
+0.00055ygdpt-10)(1 -  B) + -------------- 1----------- — a t
(1 -  058B )(1 -  076B3)
ypaex(1  -  B) = (0.63 -  0.71B2 -  0.73B9)e g r  + ----- 1--------at
1 -  0.90B t
ypaext(1 -  B) = -— 4.26^  w«et_2(1 -  B) + :— at
1 -  0.69B' 1 -  0.8B
ypaext(1 -  B) = 9.15IMF— + 26.18IMF_b + 18.63IM F^ +
+ 19.12IMF-10 + ------ 1------ at
1 -  0.76B2
ypaext(1 -  B) = 6.70reorgt-1 + 9.0reorgt-2
(7)
(8) 
(9)
( 1 0 )
( 1 1 )
- 0,00061 GDP per capita
 ^ - 0,8214 economy growth rate
yraext -  yraext - 1 0,01374 unem ploym ent rate
73,080 IMF
< 15,7 reorganization
Figure 1. Determinants o f public assistance expenditure
Equations (7) to (10) indicate that public assistance expenditure per capita growth 
was affected by the variables. This equation can be interpreted as follows (see, Fig. 1).
Firstly, the decrease in GDP and the economic growth rate, and the increase in the un­
employment rate, IM F  and reorganisation, affected the public assistance expenditure 
growth positively. That is to say, this model shows that a 1,000 won increase in GDP per  
capita in the year o f implementing welfare programs led to a decrease o f 0.61 won public 
assistance expenditure per capita, and that a 1 % increase in the economic growth rate in 
the year o f implementing welfare programs led to a decrease o f 820 won public assistance 
expenditure per capita, and that a 73,000 won increase in public assistance expenditure 
per capita followed the IM F . Additionally a 13 won increase in public assistance expen­
diture per capita followed a 1% increase in the unemployment rate. It seems that the eco­
nomic recession, as indicated by a decrease in GDP (-0.00061ygdpt) and an economic 
growth rate (-0.8214egrt), an increase in the unemployment rate (0.01374w«et) and by 
the IM F  (73.080IMFt) in the model, creates more welfare needs which leads to expendi­
ture growth.
This phenomenon seems to be connected with the relationship between economic 
conditions and general tax revenue. That is to say, a good economic situation results in 
a general tax revenue increase, which leads to welfare budget growth for the coming year.
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This interpretation predicts that if  the economic conditions o f a certain year or previous 
year were good, then public assistance expenditure for the coming year will increase. 
When the budget is created, the expected revenue is considered as one o f the important 
factors. Therefore budget officers set up the budget for the coming year, taking into ac­
count the revenue for the previous year, which was directly affected by GDP and eco­
nomic growth o f that year.
On the other hand, it is expected that an increase in unemployment rate in the year of 
budget compilation might lead to an increased demand for public assistance which might 
bring about the welfare budget growth for the coming year.
Secondly, the political variable also affected the public assistance expenditure 
growth. The equation (11) indicates that one change in terms o f reorganisation was fol­
lowed by a 15,700 won increase in public assistance expenditure.
The influence o f the governmental reorganisation may be closely related in a positive 
way to the growth in the public assistance budget. However political factors, reorganisa­
tion excepted, are not found to affect public assistance expenditure.
Thirdly, the model simplified by disregarding time lags tells us that GDP and eco­
nomic growth rate had a negative impact, unemployment rate and IM F  a positive impact, 
and governmental reorganisation a positive impact on the increase in public assistance 
expenditure growth. This fact suggests that, with the exception o f the governmental reor­
ganisation’s impact on the growth in public assistance expenditure, an increase or de­
crease in governmental revenue affected by the economic situation is a more important 
factor than the increase in demand for public assistance which is also affected by the eco­
nomic situation.
Table 8
Multivariate ARIMA modelling of social insurance expenditure 
and determinants
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Lag Variable Shift
$ ■§■
AR-1,1 0.44962 0.16759 2.68 0.0116 1 ysiex 0
NUM1 -0.0007878 0.0003209 -2.45 0.0199 0 ygdp 3
NUM1,1 -0.0013670 0.0003455 -3.96 0.0004 6 ygdp 3
3 
-
AR-1,1 -0.58216 0.18192 -3.20 0.0027 6 ysiex 0
NUM1 0.26920 0.11176 2.41 0.0207 0 egf 2
ysisx -  
une
MU 10.48159 3.69079 2.84 0.0078 0 ysiex 0
AR.1,1 -0.63552 0.18545 -3.43 0.0017 6 ysiex 0
NUM1 -1.99770 0.89902 -2.22 0.0335 0 une 9
ysiext(1 -  B) = -0.0008ygdpt-3(1 -  B) + 0.00137ygdpt-9(1 -  B) + -—  449^22? Ut
ysiext(1 -  B) = 0.27egr-2 + ------1---- -  at (13)
1 + 0.58B6
ysiext(1 -  B) = 17.14 -  0.63552ysiext-6(1 -  B) -  1.9977unet-9 + at (14)
34 Young LEE PP 3 '15
^----- -0,00057 GDP per capita
ysiext -  ysiext _ 1 <-----
-0,27 economy growth rate
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Figure 2. Determinants o f social insurance expenditure
Equations from (12) to (14) show that social insurance expenditure growth was af­
fected by the variables. This equation can be interpreted as follows (see Fig. 2): Firstly, 
the increase in GDP in the year o f implementing the social insurance program and the in­
crease in GDP both three and nine years ago positively impacted on the social insurance 
expenditure growth o f a certain year.
Social insurance expenditure growth after a GDP increase in the year o f budget execu­
tion is related to the level o f social insurance benefit. Social insurance benefit is deter­
mined by the degree o f individual contributions and the standard o f living at a certain 
year. The level of social insurance benefit is not to protect the minimum standard o f liv­
ing, but is closely connected to GDP level at any given year. The relationship between 
GDP three years ago and the social insurance budget might be related to the business cy­
cle. But whilst the nine year time lag is not yet revealed, it might also be related to the 
business cycle. Further study is needed.
The model shows the positive impact o f GDP on social insurance expenditure. This 
fact alone accounts for the political sensitivity o f the insurance budget. The nature ofpoli- 
tics can be more easily detected in budget payment than in budget compilation, because 
clients of social insurance pay more attention to the insurance payments than to compil­
ing the budget. Furthermore, in order to take more credits on social insurance benefit, it is 
better to be more prudent when compiling the insurance budget. The demand for insur­
ance payments is a more important factor in increasing the social insurance expenditure 
than the opportunity to increase the insurance fund.
Secondly, the increase in the economic growth rate of the year when budgets were 
compiled (or the previous year before implementing the programs) positively affected so­
cial insurance expenditure growth. A 1% increase in the economic growth rate in the two 
previous years increased social insurance expenditure by 270 won. The increase in eco­
nomic growth rate brought economic prosperity, which must have positively influenced 
social insurance expenditure.
Thirdly, the increase in the unemployment rate positively affected the social insurance 
expenditure growth. A 1% increase in the unemployment rate 9 years ago increased social 
insurance expenditure by 8,430 won. It can’t be assumed that the increase in unemploy­
ment means doom and gloom for the economy. It might be suggested in the 9 year time 
lag that the increase in unemployment rate affected the increase of social insurance ex­
penditure. However this cannot be assumed.
PP 3 '15 The difference in under-expenditure of the social welfare budget in Korea 35
Fourthly, political factors are not found to affect social insurance expenditure in Ko­
rea, even though these same factors, including the election cycle, are found to affect so­
cial insurance expenditure in the U.S. The reason might be the nature o f voters: most 
Korean voters, especially the elderly who are the recipients o f social insurance, are indif­
ferent to politics, while U.S. senior citizens give much more attention to politics and use 
their voting power in the election.
Table 9
Multivariate ARIM A modelling of social service expenditure 
and determinants
Parameter Estimate StandardError t Value Pr > |t| Lag Variable Shift
ysesex -  ygdp AR.1,1 0.38183 0.22561 1.69 0.1009 4 yswsex 0
NUM1 -0.0003374 0.0000664 -5.08 <.0001 0 ygdp 2
NUMU -0.0004176 0.0000806 -5.18 <.0001 3 ygdp 2
DEN1,1 0.83439 0.09534 8.75 <.0001 8 ygdp 2
ysesex -  egr MU 8.22473 1.61261 5.10 <.0001 0 yswsex 0
AR.1,1 -0.69929 0.21208 -3.30 0.0023 2 yswsex 0
NUM1 -0.60510 0.14479 -4.18 0.0002 0 egr 0
NUM1,1 0.81257 0.21017 3.87 0.0005 3 egr 0
NUM1,2 0.47767 0.18736 2.55 0.0155 4 egr 0
DEN1,1 -1.09200 0.0035278 -309.54 <.0001 1 egr 0
ysesex -  une AR1,1 0.49191 0.19982 2.46 0.0198 4 yswsex 0
NUM1 2.93635 0.73162 4.01 0.0004 0 une 2
NUM1,1 -4.69924 0.92754 -5.07 <.0001 8 une 2
ysesex -  IMF NUM1 32.45300 5.25633 6.17 <.0001 0 IMF 11
ysesex -  reorg NUM1 4.21568 2.00375 2.10 0.0417 0 reorg 1
DEN1,1 0.66547 0.20438 3.26 0.0023 1 reorg 1
0.0003 0.00042B  3 1
yswsext(1 -  B) = ------------ - ygdpt-2 + ------------ r  ygdpt-2 + ------------4 at (15)
1 -  0.83B8 1 -  0.83B8 1 -  038B 4
yswsext(1 -  B) = (-0.605 -  0.813B3 -  0.478B4)egrt + ------ 1------ at (16)
1 + 0.70B2
yswsext(1 -  B) = (2.94 + 4.70B8)unet-2(1 -  B) + ------ 1------ at (17)
1 -  0.49B4
yswsext(1 -  B) = 32.453IMFt-11 + at (18)
4.22
yswsext(1 -  B) = -— reorgt-1 + at (19)
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Figure 3. Determinants o f social service expenditure
Equations (15) to (19) indicate that social service expenditure per capita growth was 
affected by the variables. This equation can be interpreted as follows (see, Fig. 3).
Firstly, the decrease in GDP and the economic growth rate, and the increase in the un­
employment rate, IM F  and reorganisation positively impacted upon social service expen­
diture growth. That is to say, this model shows that a 1,000 won increase in GDP per  
capita in the year of implementing welfare programs led to a decrease in 0.73 won social 
service expenditure per capita, and that a 1 % increase in the economic growth rate in the 
year o f implementing welfare programs led to a decrease o f 1,896 won social service ex­
penditure per capita. It also showed that a 7,640 won increase in social service expendi­
ture per capita followed a 1% increase in the unemployment rate, and that a 32,453 won 
increase in social service expenditure p er capita followed an IM F  increase. It seems that 
the economic recession, as indicated by a decrease in GDP (-0.000725ygdpt) and the eco­
nomic growth rate (-1.896egrt), an increase in the unemployment rate (7.64w«et) and in 
the IM F  (32.453IMFt) in the model, creates more welfare needs which lead to an increase 
in expenditure.
Secondly, the political variable also equally affected the public assistance expenditure 
growth. Equation (19) tells us that one change in reorganisation was followed by a 12,780 
won increase in social service expenditure.
This phenomenon seems the same for public assistant expenditure i.e. that public as­
sistance and social service expenditures increased at the time o f economic depression and 
decreased at the time o f economic prosperity. The relationship between public assistance 
and social service budgets is found to be the ‘go-with relationship’, which means that 
both expenditures moved in the same direction almost simultaneously.
Implications of the research findings
The main purpose o f this study has been to explore the relationships and determinants 
of the social welfare budget in the Korea. Research findings are summarized as follows.
Firstly, public assistance and social service expenditures show competitive nature in 
relation to social insurance expenditure, which is tested in the Box-Jenkins’s multivariate 
ARIMA models. The testing result shows that competitive relations are spurious, because 
economic variables intervened and had effects on both expenditures simultaneously.
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Secondly, public assistance and social service expenditures increased at the time of 
economic depression and decreased at the time o f economic prosperity, while social in­
surance expenditure increased at the time o f economic prosperity and decreased at the 
time o f economic depression. The relationship between public assistance and social ser­
vice budgets is best described by the ‘go-with relationship’, which means both expendi­
tures moved in the same direction almost simultaneously.
Thirdly, economic variables are found to be the most important factors to affect social 
welfare budgets. According to the economic situation, social welfare budgets -  especially 
public assistance and social service budgets -  change.
Fourthly, political factors (reorganisation excepted) are not found to affect social in­
surance expenditure in Korea, while the same factors, including the election cycle, are 
found to affect social insurance expenditure in the U.S. The reason might be the nature of 
voters -  most Korean voters, especially the elderly who are the recipients o f social insur­
ance are largely indifferent to politics, while in the U.S. senior citizens pay much atten­
tion to politics and use their voting power in an election.
Fifthly, changes within governmental organisations, such as reorganising existing 
welfare bureaux or departments, or establishing new agencies, has an effect on the in­
crease or the decrease in public assistance and social service expenditures.
This study contributes to both developments in budget theory and budget politics in so 
far as it attempted to combine budget theory with time-series models using empirical 
data. Indeed, the fact that the increase and decrease variation in budget by a variable such 
as either economic condition or governmental organisations is capable o f prediction is of 
great significance.
However, some findings remain in the ARIMA models that could not be interpreted 
with existing theories and conjecture such as the 9 year time lag, etc. Further studies are 
required. Even with these reservations, this study is a challenging and provocative contri­
bution to the study of determinants and relations o f budget.
Bibliography
Advisory Council on Social Security (1980), Social Security Financing, “Social Security Bulletin” 
43(5), pp. 18-29.
Beck N. (1982), Does there exist a political business cycle: A Box-Tiao analysis, Public Choice 38(2), 
pp. 205-209.
Breunig C. (2003), Distribution o f  budget changes in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, “Paper presented at the Western Political Science Meetings”, Portland, OR, March 
11-13.
Clayton L. (1976), The Fiscal Limits to the Warfare-Welfare State: Defense and Welfare Spending in 
the U.S. since 1900, “Western Political Quarterly”, 29.
Congressional Budget Office, the Congress of the Republic of Korea (1965-2008) Fiscal yearbook.
Downs A. (1957), An Economic Theory o f  Democracy, Harper&Row, New York.
Edwards R. E et al. (1972), The Capitalist System: A Radical Analysis o f  American Society, 
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Gujarati D. (1978) Basic Econometrics, McGraw-Hill Book Company.
38 Young LEE PP 3 '15
Hanm S., Kamlet S., Mowery C. (1996), The Political Economy o f  Deficit Spending in Nine Industrial­
ized Parliamentary Democracies: The Role o f  Fiscal Institutions, “Comparative Political 
Studies” 29, pp. 52-77.
Henrekson M. (1993), Law-A spurious relationship?, “Public Finance” 48(2), pp. 406-415.
Jordan M. (2002), Punctuated Equilibrium: An Agenda-Based Theory o f  Budgeting, in: Budget Theory 
in the Public Sector, eds. A. Khan, W. B. Hildreth, Quorum Books, London, pp. 202-215.
Key V. O. (1949), Southern Politics in State and Nation, Knof, New York.
Korea National Assembly (2009), The annals o f  the Republic o f  Korea National Assembly from 1948 
to 2008.
McCleary R., Hay R. A. (1980), Applied Time Seriesfor the Social Sciences, Sage, Beverly Hill, Cal.
Monroe K. (1983), Political manipulation o f  the economy: a closer look at political business cycle, 
“Presidential Studies Quarterly” 13, pp. 37-49.
Monroe R., Metcalf L. (1983), Economic influences on presidential popularity among key political 
and socioeconomic groups: A review o f  the evidence and some new findings, “Political Behav­
iour” 5(3), pp. 309-345.
Mueller D. (2003), Public Choice III, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.
Myers R. J. (1983), Financial Status o f  the Social Security Program, “Social Security Bulletin” 46(3), 
pp. 3-13.
Nordhaus W. (1975), The Political Business Cycle, “Review of Economic Studies” 42, pp. 169-190.
O’Neill J. A. (1979), Alternatives fo r  Financing a Mature Social Security System, in: Controlling the 
Cost o f  Social Security, ed. C. D. Campbell, D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Mass.
Oestrum C. (1978), A reactive linkage model o f  the U.S. defence expenditure policy making process, 
“American Political Science Review” 72, pp. 941-957.
PeroffK. (1977), The Warfare-Welfare Trade-off: Health, Public Aid and Housing, “Journal of Sociol­
ogy and Social Welfare” 4(1), pp. 1125-1140.
Peroff K., Pedolak-Warren M. (1979), Does Spending on Defence Cut Spending on Health? 
A Time-Series Analysis o f  the US Economy 1929-1974, “British Journal of Political Science” 
9(1), pp. 21-39.
Robinson S. (2004), Punctuated Equilibrium, Bureaucratization, and Budgetary Changes in Schools, 
“Policy Studies Journal” 32(1), pp. 25-39.
Rubin S. (2000), The Politics o f  Public Budgeting, Seven Bridges Press, New York.
Russett B. (1982), Defense expenditures and national well-being, “American Political Science Re­
view” 76, pp. 767-777.
SAS Institute Inc. (1982), SAS ETS, SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC.
Soh Byung Hee (1988), Political instability and economic fluctuations in the Republic o f  Korea, “Pub­
lic Choice” 57(3), pp. 259-274.
Song Keun-Won (1989a), Determinants o f  the Social Insurance Expenditure in US, “Korean Political 
Science Review” 23(1), pp. 299-315.
Song Keun-Won (1989b), Determinants o f  the Public Assistance Expenditure in US, “Korean Public 
Administration Review” 23(1), pp. 331-341.
Tim J., Nic M. (1999), Consumption, sustainable welfare and human needs-with reference to UK ex­
penditure patterns between 1954 and 1994, “Ecological Economics” 28, pp. 421-441.
Tufte (1978), Political Control o f  the Economy, Princeton University Press.
Van de Water P. N. (1984), Social Security Financing: An Overview o f  the Issues and Options, in: Con­
trolling the Cost o f  Social Security, ed. C. D. Campbell, D.C. Heath and Company, pp. 59-79.
Wagner R. E. (1983), Funded Social security: Collective and Private Options, “Cato Journal” 3(2).
Wildavsky A. (1984), The Politics o f  the Budgetary Process, 4th ed., Brown and Co., Little.
PP 3 '15 The difference in under-expenditure of the social welfare budget in Korea 39
Yu Geum-Rok (2007), A Time Series Analysis o f  Policy Punctuations in the Korean Central Govern­
ment Budget, “The Korean Association for Public Administration” 41(2), pp. 95-116.
Web Search
The Korean Statistical Information Service, http://kosis.kr.
The Bank o f  Korea Economic Statistics System, http://ecos.bok.or.kr.
Różnica w wydatkach niekwalifikowanych budżetu pomocy społecznej w Korei
Streszczenie
Przedmiotem badania jest relacja między wydatkami niekwalifikowanym budżetu pomocy społecz­
nej w ramach ograniczonego budżetu Korei w okresie 1965-2008. W artykule wskazano, że pomoc pub­
liczna i wydatki na usługi społeczne są nie do porównania z wydatkami ubezpieczenia narodowego 
zgodnie z wielowariantowymi modelami ARIMA Box-Jenkins. Ich obecność poddana współmierności 
jest fałszywa ze względu na wpływ czynników polityczno-gospodarczych. Rezultaty badania w tym ar­
tykule mogą wnieść wkład w rozwój teorii budżetowej i polityk budżetowych. Jednak niektóre rezultaty 
badań powstałych w oparciu o modele ARIMA mogły być nieadekwatne do poddania interpretacji w ra­
mach istniejących teorii i formułują przypuszczenia takie jak te z dziewięcioletnim opóźnieniem, etc. 
W związku z tym dalsze badania są konieczne.
Słowa kluczowe: budżet pomocy społecznej, wielowariantowy model ARIMA
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